judicial and coercive power (Thompson, 2003) . While colonial rule bequeathed to Uganda the essential apparatus needed to define a modern nation-state, it failed to reconcile the competing expectations of the different feudal and tribal societies that made up the territory of Uganda.
Historically, the people of the central region, Buganda, were viewed as collaborators in the colonization of Uganda. They made tremendous strides in developing their infrastructure, educational and other social services. Other groups have both envied and denigrated Buganda as a basis for their own political advancement. Buganda's demands for a special position in the postindependence period were seen as manifestations of a bogus superiority, which had to be subdued by the so-called republicans. To this day it has been difficult to sustain effective civilian administration in Uganda because of the problems in reconciling the interests of different regions and peoples. Even rational political demands such as creating a federation of autonomous regions were viewed as suspect because they were spearheaded by Buganda. The Ugandan state remains fragile, with tensions simmering just below the surface.
In 1962, Sir Frederick Mutesa, the Kabaka or ruler of the territory of Buganda, was elected the first President of Uganda. As a monarch, he found it difficult to take orders from the national government, which was headed by a commoner, A. Milton Obote. In 1964 there was a referendum to decide whether two counties, which Buganda had annexed, should be returned to the neighbouring territory of Bunyoro. Bunyoro won, but Mutesa refused to sign the transfer instrument, thereby creating a crisis for the government. From that point matters deteriorated rapidly. Until 1966 Uganda managed to maintain a degree of stability, but in that year matters came to a head, as the Buganda government resolved to expel the Ugandan government from its soil (Ibingira, 1980) . This event played into the hands of Obote, whose national government responded by sending soldiers to the Kabaka's palace to 'investigate' the presence of arms. The soldiers (headed by Idi Amin) overran the palace and forced the Kabaka into exile. Obote proceeded to suspend the constitution crafted for the independence of Uganda and declared himself executive president, head of state and government and commander-inchief of the armed forces. Most of the officers and men used in this exploit were from the same ethnic group as Obote. This 'Uganda crisis', as it came to be known, had an immediate and enduring political impact. By using the army to overthrow the status quo, Obote introduced and entrenched the military as coercive arbiter of conflict in Uganda (Henstridge, 1995) . Obote became increasingly dictatorial. To deal with dissent, he introduced draconian laws like the Emergency Powers (Detention) Regulations in 1966. He also used state security institutions to cow his political opponents; these included members of his cabinet, four of whom were arrested during a cabinet meeting. His new constitution, ratified in 1967, concentrated power in the Presidency and the National Assembly.
Radicals viewed this constitution as a positive effort to create a strong and effective central government, but the country now was divided between traditionalists and non-traditionalists. Obote subdued the National Assembly, which was now largely composed of members of his party, the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC). The country was now effectively a one-party state and Obote confirmed this shortly by banning all opposition parties.
At the time of independence in 1962, Uganda had one of the most vigorous and promising economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the years following independence had amply demonstrated this economic potential (World Bank, 1993a) . The country was self-sufficient in food, and the agricultural sector earned ample foreign exchange through the export of coffee, cotton and cocoa, despite traditional methods of production. A vibrant manufacturing sector supplied basic inputs and consumer goods. Mining in the south supplied copper and cobalt for export, and the country enjoyed a positive balance of trade. Fiscal and monetary management was sound, and the domestic savings rate averaged about 15 per cent of GDP. There was a strong local administrative system that provided effective supervision of economic activity by disciplining all those who were not productive. The locals needed little coercion to produce, since consumption was predicated on what they produced (Thompson, 2003) .
Obote, like several African heads of state, had become enamoured of socialism, and proposed at a UPC party conference in 1968, as part of his modernization philosophy, that Uganda 'move to the left' in ideology and practice. He laid the groundwork for socialism in his 'Common Man's Charter ' (1970) , which began by declaring that the main purpose of government was 'the realization of the real meaning of Independence, namely, that the resources of the country, material and human, be exploited for the benefit of all the people of Uganda in accordance with the principles of socialism' (Obote, 1970, p. 1) . Article 38 declares furthermore that 'the guiding economic principles must be that the means of production and distribution be in the hands of the people' (p. 9). In effect, Obote's 'Charter' offered a blueprint for a mixed economy, in which government controlled the commanding heights. The blueprint was put into effect beginning Labour Day (May 1), 1970, when Obote announced his intention to nationalize oil companies, Kampala Bus Services, the Kilembe mines, banks and other companies.
The nationalization strategy, which was poorly conceived, had a serious impact on the economy. First, it precipitated the flight of capital because there were no indigenous managers to run the nationalized companies. Expatriate managers therefore had to be retained, but they found it tempting to repatriate their profits from this increasingly volatile environment (Kasozi, 1994) . Second, the government launched ambitious programmes to build hospitals and schools in various parts of the country, but this spate of construction left the country seriously indebted. Third, several parastatal corporations were created under the auspices of the Uganda Development Corporation (UDC) to take on some of the activities of nationalized companies. The UDC had been created in 1952 as a vehicle for investment, not for nationalization of existing business firms. The new parastatals were given monopolies over the marketing of export, produce and commodities, but proved inept and corrupt. Fourth, the cooperatives and trade unions, which had been strong up to that point, were throttled by incessant interference and legislation such as the Cooperative Act of 1970 (Kasozi, 1994 ). Obote's 'Africanization' programme failed dismally to create a local property-owning (business) class to take over management of the economy. In effect, Obote's policies disenfranchised the non-citizens who ran the economy without empowering the African natives who, hitherto, had not been allowed to participate in commerce, industry and large-scale agriculture. The experiments in socialism, the enlargement of the bureaucracy and the ambitious investment in infrastructure without regard to budgetary or economic fundamentals began to eat away at the economy. The situation was compounded by innuendoes of corruption in government, and by growing violence.
Amin's economic war, 1972-79
Obote used the army to abuse the population with impunity. His dictatorial tendencies and Buganda-phobia alienated large sections of the army, public services and regional authorities as well. More importantly, he lost the trust of the business community and the Western bloc by nationalizing businesses in which multinational companies were stakeholders. By 1971, discontent and corruption in the army, arising mainly out of inequitable promotions and poor care for soldiers crystallized into a coup d'état. It has been suggested that there was foreign involvement in this coup. Whatever the immediate causes, the coup brought to power Idi Amin, a former corporal in the British colonial army who had been used by Obote to quell several riots. Amin did not actually participate in the coup, but used popular indignation against Obote to gain power. The United Kingdom and Israel first recognized Amin as the legitimate ruler of Uganda, largely because of their economic interests. The Israelis provided his forces with training and logistical support, and the British convinced other Commonwealth member states to accord Uganda recognition. There was considerable International Monetary Fund (IMF) involvement in the first budget of the Amin government and the conduct of fiscal policy was, initially, not wholly outrageous (Henstridge, 1995) .
Then, in one fell swoop, Idi Amin set the conditions for economic decay, which he oversaw until his overthrow eight years later. In 1972 he declared an 'Economic War' against 'imperialist' forces and the large Asian community in Uganda. Increased defence spending, financed by bank borrowing, made the national budget untenable. Annual inflation rates shot to double digits (World Bank, 1993a) . Like Obote, Amin believed that it was important to address the social inequality that prevailed in the country by economically empowering Ugandans. At this time, Uganda's Asian population had extensive control over the economy as artisans, shopkeepers, industrialists and professionals. In particular, they controlled local and international trade. Amin expelled the Asians, and in this way continued the wave of nationalizations that Obote had begun. Increased insecurity and persecution of white-collar workers resulted in an additional mass exodus of professional managers of all nationalities and persuasions. The vacuum that was created by his actions marked the beginning of Uganda's economic collapse.
Amin did not relax the economic regulations instituted by Obote; in effect, he presided over the social and economic destruction of Uganda. On the social side, the people were markedly traumatized: official murders, torture and abductions became the order of the day for all types of crimes. Estimates of how many people died as the violence escalated range from 50 000 (Kasozi, 1994, p. 104) to 500 000 (World Bank, 1993) . The social disorder occasioned by Amin's regime jeopardized transactions and assets, and diminished the social capital of Uganda (Collier and Pradham, 1998) . Because essential commodities were scarce, there developed a wide disparity between official prices and actual market prices. The black market prospered, to the benefit not only of smugglers, but public officials, who through personal influence could obtain (and re-sell) 'allocation chits' for sugar, beer, salt and even foreign exchange. The government reacted by setting up an anti-smuggling unit. Economic crimes such as overcharging, hoarding, smuggling, corruption and dealing in foreign currency became punishable by torture or public execution. The net effect was to further emaciate the economy, as the biggest culprits were influential public officials who were not punished.
Uganda became a pariah state and was faced various international embargoes. It had been a charter member of the East African Community (EAC), a trading bloc that included Kenya and Tanzania. The EAC collapsed, further isolating Uganda. Key industries relocated to Kenya. Services such as air transport and telecommunications, which had benefited from the existence of the EAC, also suffered. The rail transport system collapsed and this further increased the costs of inputs. Production, as measured by constant-price GDP, declined by 13 per cent between 1971 and 1986. In absolute terms the economy declined by 1 per cent per year (Collier and Reinikka, 2001) , even as Uganda's population was growing rapidly. Many factories collapsed due to lack of inputs, which were imported, and due to the absence of vertical or horizontal linkages between economic sectors. All sectors, with the possible exception of subsistence agriculture, suffered from the lack of imported inputs. Between 1970 and 1979, the per capita income of Uganda fell from US$225 to US$148. The debt-export ratio grew from 51.1 per cent to 142.2 per cent, and agriculture's share of GDP rose from 48.5 per cent to 70.5 per cent as the manufacturing sector collapsed.
For eight years, as Amin ran roughshod over the populace, there were several uprisings and attempted coups. Plots and mutinies in the army occurred in 1972 , 1974 , 1975 , 1976 and 1979 . In 1972 , the remnants of Obote's army and other exiles attempted an ill-fated attack from Tanzania. Yoweri Museveni, who later was to become president, led one of the groups. Brave men and women risked their lives to end Amin's brutality, but most of the opposition was uncoordinated. Amin himself turned the tide, when in 1978 he ordered his troops to attack the Kagera Salient, a border region of Tanzania. The Tanzanians retaliated, and were joined by an umbrella coalition of Ugandan exiles, the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF). Kampala, the capital city, fell on 11 April 1979 to the advancing Tanzanian forces and the ragtag army of exiles.
The post-Amin era, 1979-86
Between 1979 and 1980, Uganda had three governments. Two were created under the banner of the UNLF, whose diverse composition of exiles and rebel elements and lack of cohesive objectives plunged Uganda into further chaos and violence. The UNLF had been formed as a guerrilla organization in Tanzania; two weeks later, it found itself at the head of the country (Kanyeihamba, 2002) . There was no national army, but rather several armed groups. The largest, the Kikoosi Maalum, was allied to Obote. The second, led by Yoweri Museveni, vehemently opposed Obote's return to power. The scene thus was set for further conflict. The first UNLF president, Yusufu K. Lule, managed only 68 days in office before he was forced out by the conspiracies that involved both the UNLF and Julius Nyerere, the president of Tanzania. The next president, Godfrey L. Binaisa, lasted until May 1980, when he was removed by Paulo Muwanga, again with the tacit approval of the Tanzanian forces. Muwanga's regime returned Milton Obote through elections of questionable validity.
Obote's 'second coming' heralded a period of terror in Uganda as he sought to hold state power regardless of the cost. Several armed opposition groups, which included the National Resistance Movement (NRM), rejected the results of the election and took up armed rebellion on the pretext that Obote's regime was illegitimate. As many as a million people may have lost their lives in the civil war that resulted (Kasozi, 1994) . For another five years, unspeakable atrocities were visited on the Ugandan people, both through the machinery of state and through sabotage by rebels. Grave violations of people's rights and misgovernment were the order of the day. Obote had learnt his lesson regarding the military, and he let them have their way; when soldiers were not paid, they were free to go marauding in the population. The state had dissolved into anarchy and all civil institutions had broken down.
Not surprisingly, economic mismanagement continued during the second Obote regime. Disparate ideologies in the factionalized UNLF hindered the articulation of meaningful economic policy. There were attempts at stabilizing the macroeconomic framework, but given the continuing war, these were largely unworkable. During the war that ousted Amin, Uganda's infrastructure and industrial plant had been largely destroyed: out of 930 enterprises registered in 1971, only 300 remained in the early 1980s, with an estimated capacity utilization of just 5 per cent (Livingstone, 1998) . Such was the sorry state of Uganda at the time of 'liberation' from Amin's excesses. The destruction continued after 1979. The Luwero Triangle, the food basket of the central region, was destroyed in a kind of 'scorched earth' policy (Kasozi, 1994, p. 185) . The lack of political stability made it impossible to initiate or implement economic recovery.
The government attempted to regulate the foreign exchange market through a two-tier pricing system. Essential goods and services were to be purchased at an official rate, while non-essential goods and services at a market rate. The system soon broke down because strategically positioned public officials could buy on the official rate and sell through the 'kibanda' or black market. Despite the war, during this four-year period there were some gains. GDP grew by 5.5 per cent and inflation fell to about 20 per cent, while the current account was in surplus (Edmonds, 1998) . Per capita incomes recovered from a low of US$136 per annum to US$187 per annum and the share of agriculture in GDP fell from 70.5 per cent in 1980 to 50.5 per cent in 1985. Yet this first attempt to stabilize and improve economic performance is largely remembered as a failure because of the continuing instability. Exports fell from US$415 million in 1980 to US$368 million in 1984 while the external debt rose from US$568 million to over US$1 billion in 1985. Inflation had initially been tamed by external aid and relief assistance, but shot from 47.4 to 156 per cent, between 1983 and 1985.
Economic recovery, 1986-2002
Obote's second government was toppled on 27 July1985, ironically by sections of his army. The bush war, which had started in 1981, also ended shortly on 25 January 1986 with victory for the NRM. Led by Yoweri Museveni, the NRM had begun its 'people's war' in 1981. In a 10-point programme, it declared that the people had a right to defend themselves against those who threatened the democratic order and human rights, and that no more would the state be used to violate the rights of the people. The NRM formed a broad-based government, with promise of elections after four years. The NRM-ruled government scheduled elections for 1989, but did not carry through, on the pretext that the new constitution was not ready. Over the next eight years an official commission produced a draft constitution, which was debated in a Constituent Assembly (partly an elected body) and promulgated in 1995. In the first election for president and members of parliament (1996), Yoweri Museveni was victorious. In a second, more bitterly contested election (2001), his margin was considerably reduced. The results were challenged in court but were upheld by a Supreme Court majority of three to two.
When the NRM government came to power in 1986, it deeply opposed IMF programmes. Instead, it favoured revaluing the Ugandan shilling, allocating commodities administratively, and in controlling prices and maintaining monopolies. Some NRM functionaries believed strongly in statist economic policies, and pointed to the rapid economic deterioration between 1981 and 1986 as a consequence of the first structural adjustment efforts. Faced with an-almost bankrupt treasury, however, the NRM was forced to abandon this 'go it alone' strategy. Inflation was running at 147 per cent between July and December 1986 and the effective exchange rate had increased by 128 per cent (World Bank, 1993a) . In May 1987 the NRM government accepted an economic reform programme sponsored by the World Bank and supported by the IMF and agencies of the European Union (Brett, 1995) .
The reforms involved orthodox adjustment measures -policies to liberalize and stabilize the economy. In Uganda's case, liberalization involved the removal of price controls, the institution of a free exchange-rate mechanism and allowing interest rates and foreign-exchange transactions be marketdetermined. Stabilization meant imposing a tight regime of fiscal and monetary management on public-sector borrowing and reforming the regulatory framework. The aim was to control macroeconomic indicators such as inflation so as to improve incentives to the private sector, and develop human capital through investment in education and health (Sejjaaka, 1996; World Bank, 1996) .
The structural adjustment programme was implemented vigorously, albeit with mixed results. A currency-reform exercise involving a 30 per cent tax was implemented and the shilling was devalued from 14 to 60 to the US dollar. Yet there was no consistent direction or grasp for that matter of how economic fundamentals (fiscal deficit, exchange rates, inflation and exports) should be dealt with. Between 1987 and 1992, inflation fell from 200 to 48.5 per cent, but continuing drought, insurgencies and shortfalls in donor assistance forced the government to increase the money supply. Loose budget control also resulted in huge deficits. Macroeconomic stability was eventually restored through prudent budgeting as well as fiscal and monetary policy (Henstridge and Kasekende, 2001 ). Many civil servants were retrenched, while the government cut expenditures and curtailed public-sector borrowing. A 'cash flow' budget system was introduced to monitor resources and spending while ensuring that fiscal policy remained consistent with low inflation. In 1993, the dual foreign exchange rates were unified, by introducing inter-bank currency auctions. Also in 1993, the Uganda Revenue Authority was established, helping to improve tax revenue collection, and the Bank of Uganda was given autonomy in supervising commercial banks.
These measures restored the revenue-to-GDP ratio to 11.2 per cent, though this remains still very low compared to other Sub-Saharan countries.
As part of the liberalization programme, the Uganda government moved to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers, particularly for agricultural exports. Before 1987, exports of coffee, tea and cotton were managed through marketing monopolies. Trade in tea and cotton had declined drastically. Coffee exports persisted because coffee production required low inputs, and coffee as a product depreciated slowly and was easy to smuggle (Henstridge, 1995) . The government switched from export to import taxes because the latter did not penalize exports. The liberalization of export crop marketing also involved elimination of the inefficient, state-run marketing boards. Despite depressed prices on the world market, farm-gate prices for coffee rose by as much as five times. Still, the coffee sector continues to suffer from the vicissitudes of the world market. Uganda also continues to suffer from an unfavourable balance of trade. Imports constitute 26 per cent of GDP, while exports are only 10 per cent. Moreover, 94 per cent of those exports are primary products with little added value.
To attract foreign investment, the Government of Uganda needed to restore its reliability. In 1991, it established an investment code and attempted to undo or at least mitigate the past expropriation of foreign investments. The confiscated properties of departed Asians were returned, and the provisions of the Preferential Trade Agreement, which had favoured firms with majority domestic ownership, were revoked (Collier and Reinikka, 2001) . Between 1991 and 1999, many nationalized companies were returned to their owners or privatized. All these measures were intended to encourage and fast track foreign investment. The tax incentives provided under the 1991 investment code have since been abolished.
The government also instituted a programme in 1992 to reform and divest public enterprises (PEs). At this time there were 116 public enterprises, of which 60 were industrial (Livingstone, 1998) . These enterprises were characterized by low productivity, endemic losses and huge indebtedness to government and the private sector. They received subsidies amounting to 50 per cent of public domestic revenue, despite contributing only a meagre 10 per cent to GDP, and they accounted for 18 per cent of total bank credit (Collier and Reinikka, 2001) . They constituted an excessive administrative burden on public resources and needed to be offloaded. It was, however, politically difficult to privatize them. For years they had provided a safe haven for inept public officials, employed relatives of high-ranking government officials and cash-rich individuals who faced the predatory actions of politicians. This strong constituency opposed and continues to oppose privatization. Nevertheless, 103 PEs were either sold off, restructured or liquidated by the end of 2002 -leading to increased output, higher tax payment and more meaningful job creation. Privatized companies have attracted significant new investment, at least where profiteers have not stripped the assets of the companies they purchased. The privatization programme succeeded, but not as well as it might have. A survey by Uganda Manufacturers Association Consultancy and Information Services found that the programme achieved its fiscal social, and economic objectives, but that the process was perceived to be corrupt (Collier and Reinikka, 2001, p. 38) . Because of its inadequate legal and institutional framework and because responsibilities were ill defined, the privatization programme received severe criticism from parliament and was partly suspended.
Parliament suspended the privatization programme in part because it was lacking in transparency. Corruption has become a serious impediment to business in Uganda. It increases the costs of doing business because firms must pay bribes when dealing with public officials; the bribes are based on the issues at stake, and higher bribes do not necessarily result in more beneficial government favours to business (Svensson, 2001) . Corruption is a tax, which reduces the return to private capital and slows growth, but even as a tax it does not end up as public revenue.
Conclusion
At the dawn of independence in 1962, Uganda's economic prospects seemed bright. It had very good social services, a buoyant economy and visions of emancipation. Not many could have foretold the capricious and degenerative path that Uganda took. Various writers (Kasozi, 1994; Collier and Reinikka, 2001 ) have attributed the destructive development path that Uganda took to a number of internal factors: Uganda's dependence on primary commodities; the slow growth of economic opportunity, as measured against the rapid growth of the population; ethnic intolerance and lack of democratic institutions; social inequality; and the absence of a propertyowning class to counter the effects of social disorder. These factors have hardly been resolved and the state remains dysfunctional in several respects. Because Ugandan society was so fractionalized, the administrative structures inherited by the state at independence could not hold the centre, and the economy became weaker as a result of dependence upon primordial forms of economic production and declining world market prices. These vulnerabilities foster a kind of rent-seeking in the political and economic spheres of life, which operates to the detriment of lawful existence. Business enterprise, which is morally acceptable and upright, comes in a poor second for those who can appropriate wealth to themselves through corruption and violence.
Civil strife and political instability between 1966 and 1986 seriously eroded prospects for economic development. The nationalization of multinational businesses resulted in both mismanagement and the flight of capital. The expulsion of the Asian community destroyed the bulwark of commerce. The atrocious civil conflict and destruction of infrastructure also contributed to the degeneration. The collapse of farm-gate prices for primary products (coffee, cotton and tobacco) depressed the rural economy. All these factors combined to negate government capacity to raise taxes and develop adequate social and physical infrastructure. The ongoing AIDS crisis, and ethnic conflict in the north and southwest continue to hinder efforts to rebuild the Ugandan economy. As in the 1950s, Uganda's political and economic development remains fragile.
However, despite the recurring political crises, there has been increased political stability since 1987. The country has made some political progress during the 17 years of NRM rule. The press has a reasonable degree of independence, and the country has recovered some of its original international standing. Peace has been restored in most of the country, and a large part has remained relatively stable and amenable to the authority of the state, although insurgencies occur in the northern and south-western regions. Extra-judicial killings appear to be a thing of the past. The legislative and judicial branches of government continue to enjoy a reasonable degree of freedom from the executive branch. The political system since 1986 has been a 'Movement' system or non-party democracy. According to the 1995 Constitution, all Ugandans are members and free to vie for any elective post on the basis of 'individual merit'. In reality, factional candidates still seek elective office. The 2001 election marked the beginning of a legitimate and cohesive challenge to the authority of the NRM. Charges of corruption, intolerance and perceptions of social inequality have led to the NRM developing a siege mentality. Internal dissent or criticism is increasingly unwelcome. Consequently the broad-based and inclusive approach that had been championed in the early years is being steadily restricted (Kanyeihamba, 2002) .
Since 1987, Uganda also has achieved a certain measure of economic stability, thanks to aid from international finance institutions and improved foreign investment. Key economic indicators for the period [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] show the overall impact of economic reform programmes as positive, with improvements in law and order, rehabilitation of the infrastructure and sustained GDP growth at about 5.6 per cent from 1986 to 2002. Inflation fell to below 5.8 per cent in 1999.
Yet problems persist. The Ugandan state is still fragile, and the economy is weak and dependent on the magnanimity of the lending and foreign policy prescriptions of donor countries. Since independence, Uganda has borrowed more than US$3.1 billion, and it is one of the most 'Highly Indebted Poor Countries' (HIPC) in the world. Aid flows peaked in fiscal year 1993-94 at fully two-thirds of public expenditure. From 1989 to 2001, these aid flows dropped to 51 per cent. Yet with donor input still running at over half of the budget, it remains to be seen how long Uganda can remain a successful case of adjustment, especially in the light of creeping donor fatigue. The current debt burden, according to the Uganda Debt Network, exceeded US$4 billion by June 2003 (Uganda Debt Network, 2003) . The burdens imposed by this debt are worsening. As measured by the ratio of debt to exports and other relevant services, which in effect measures the amount of foreign exchange earnings foregone in servicing debt, this ratio increased from 16.2 per cent in 1989-99 to 20.4 per cent in 1999-2000.
As a result of these ambiguous trends and indicators, the challenges for international business remain enormous. The liberalized environment has encouraged the return and arrival of several multinational business corporations through an aggressive investment promotion programme. The challenge to the Ugandan government and guest multinationals is to reduce poverty while holding onto the gains recorded so far. Yet potent obstacles remain: disregard for constitutionalism, lack of democracy, intolerance and poverty all combine to make a powerful statement. Growth has not been evenly distributed, and in some respects poverty has been intensified by continued civil strife, especially in northern Uganda. It is in this environment that multinational corporations are required to invest and operate at world-class standards. Those multinationals that seek to honour the principles of good governance are on the receiving end of intractable pressures to appease diverse and often conflicting constituencies. Weak institutional environments, poor observance of human rights, low social capital and a poor policy environment create fickle business conditions. Still, the demands for social responsibility and good governance remain real. The case studies that follow will explore how several multinational firms have addressed these challenges.
